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Abstract
Despite ongoing declines in fertility in many countries, the popula-
tion of the world is experiencing a period of rapid expansion, and its size is
expected to exceed 10 billion by the end of the demographic transition.
Three causes of this growth are identified and quantified: 1) fertility above
the replacement level of two surviving children per woman, 2) continuing
declines in mortality, and 3) population momentum resulting from a young
age structure.  A set of simple analytic expressions is proposed for estimat-
ing these factors from standard demographic indicators.  Population mo-
mentum is shown to be the main cause of future growth in most countries
and regions.
Over the past century virtually all countries have made rapid progress
through their demographic transitions, as reflected in large declines in birth and
death rates. Population growth has been rapid, because reductions in death rates
preceded declines in birth rates. The population size of the world increased from
1.6 billion in 1900 to 2.5 billion in 1950 and to 6.1 billion at the end of this
century. The populations of the industrialized world (the “North”) have essen-
tially completed their transitions,1  and, even including immigration, the average
rate of population growth in the North is only a fraction of one percent per year.
In contrast, in much of the developing world (the “South”), population growth
continues at a high pace, despite substantial reductions in fertility over the past
several decades.
Projections made by the United Nations and the World Bank assume all
countries will complete their demographic transitions over the next century. Popu-
lation size for the world as a whole is expected to rise to 10.4 billion by 2100
according to the UN (1998a) and to 10.0 billion according to the World Bank
(1998). Virtually all of this increase is expected to occur in the South, with the
North remaining close to its current size. Projections made by other agencies
(e.g., IIASA (Lutz 1996) and US Bureau of the Census (1999)) give similar re-
sults. At the country and region level, projected changes in population size over
the next century vary widely. In some African and Asian countries populations are
projected to more than triple in size, while declines in population size are expected
for some countries in the North.
Future trajectories in population size are determined by future trends in
fertility, mortality, and migration and by the current distribution of population by
age. The objective of this paper is to propose a procedure for quantifying these
four components of future population growth. The contributions attributable to
the different factors are first measured by making a set of hypothetical projec-
tions for countries and regions. In the second part of the paper, simple analytic
expressions are provided to estimate the impact of changes in factors from trends
in fertility, mortality, and age structure, so that their role can be calculated with-
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out making population projections. This analysis is not intended to evaluate the
accuracy of existing projections. Our main aim here is to improve understanding
of the demographic factors that determine long-range population growth by quan-
tifying how much of a projected change in population is due to assumed trends in
the different determinants.
WHY POPULATION  GROWTH  CONTINUES
The future growth expected for the world and most regions and countries
is attributable to four factors:
Fertility above replacement
Fertility is at replacement when each generation of women exactly replaces
the previous one (i.e., the average newborn girl gives birth to one daughter over
her lifetime). Replacement is a critical factor in population projections because it
equals the fertility level that, if maintained over time, produces zero population
growth.2  Positive or negative deviations from replacement lead in the long run to
persistent population growth or decline, respectively. Currently, replacement fer-
tility equals 2.4 births per woman in the South and 2.1 in the North. These levels
exceed 2 because children who die before reaching the reproductive ages have to
be replaced with additional births, and because the sex ratio at birth slightly ex-
ceeds one (typically 1.05 males for every female birth). Despite rapid recent de-
clines in many countries, fertility in 1995-2000 remains well above the replace-
ment level in most regions in the South, ranging from a high of 5.1 in Africa to
3.4 in South Asia and 2.7 in Latin America (UN 1998b). This implies that fertility
remains one of the key forces contributing to further growth in the South. In
contrast, fertility is now below replacement in Europe (1.4), Northern America
(1.9), and East Asia (1.8).
Projections typically assume that future fertility will decline in countries
where it is above replacement, eventually stabilizing at the replacement level
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before 2025 in Asia and Latin America and before 2050 in Africa. In countries
where fertility is now below replacement (mostly in the North), it is usually assumed
to rise back to the replacement level eventually. Maintaining fertility at replacement
assures that population growth reaches zero at the end of the transition (if mortal-
ity stops changing and migration is zero). The future trajectory of population size
is highly sensitive to deviations of fertility from the replacement level.
Declining mortality
Rapid declines in mortality have been the main cause of population growth
in the past. Global life expectancy at birth now stands at 65 years, more than
double the pretransitional level of about 30 years (UN 1998b). Since the middle
of the twentieth century, the South has experienced exceptionally rapid improve-
ments in life expectancy, which has risen from an average of about 40 years in
1950 to 63 years today.  Latin America has reached life expectancy levels similar
to those prevailing in the North in the 1960s, and Asia is not far behind.  Africa’s
mortality has been highest, resulting in a current life expectancy of 51 years. In
the North, mortality was already low in the 1950s, but life expectancy has contin-
ued to rise, reaching 75 years today.
Over the next century, projections made by the UN and World Bank as-
sume life expectancy to continue to rise in all regions. By 2025 Asia and Latin
America are both expected to have mortality conditions similar to those in the
North today, but Africa will continue to lag, in part because the continent is the
one most heavily affected by the AIDS epidemic. Achieving further reductions in
mortality may become more difficult as countries reach ever-higher levels of life
expectancy. Maximum life expectancy for all populations is assumed to be the same,
at 87.5 years for males and 92.5 for females by the UN (1998a) and at 83.3 years for
males and 90 for females by the World Bank. All countries are expected to be close to
these maxima by the middle of the twenty-second century. Whether higher values are
possible for the average human life span is the subject of an ongoing debate.
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Net immigration
In the past, net migration has been substantial toward some countries, e.g.,
the United States, and out of other countries, e.g., Mexico, but negligible in oth-
ers. Large differences in migration levels among countries are likely to be ob-
served in the future. At the world level migration is necessarily zero.
Young age structure
Even if fertility could immediately be brought to the replacement level
with constant mortality and zero migration, population growth would continue in
many countries, particularly in the South. The reason for this is a young age
structure, which is the result of high fertility and low mortality and consequent
rapid population growth in recent decades. With a large proportion of the popula-
tion under age 30, further growth over the coming decades is assured.  The rela-
tive abundance of these young people results in a birth rate that is higher than the
death rate even if fertility is at replacement. This age-structure effect is called
population momentum3  (Keyfitz 1971).
COMPONENTS OF FUTURE POPULATION  GROWTH
Future population growth will continue as long as one or more of the fol-
lowing conditions are met: fertility remains above replacement, life expectancy
keeps rising, net immigration is positive, and the population age structure is young
relative to its equilibrium structure. In population projections made by the UN,
the World Bank, and other agencies it is usually assumed that at the end of the
transition each of these factors will have moved to levels where they no longer
contribute to population growth. That is, fertility moves to the replacement level,
life expectancy to its presumed maximum, migration to zero, and the age struc-
ture to its post-transitional equilibrium (which depends on the mortality pattern).
This set of assumptions conveniently ensures zero population growth, but there
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is, of course, no assurance that this in fact will happen. We return to this issue in
a later section, but for now we accept this convention.
The contribution of each of the preceding demographic factors to future
population growth can be estimated with a simple series of hypothetical projec-
tions.  In these projections, the influence of one factor is removed at each succes-
sive step. The starting point is a standard projection, which is determined by all
four factors. The next step in this exercise is to estimate the future growth that
would occur if migration is set to zero from 2000 onward. The resulting projec-
tion variant will be called natural. In a third variant the effect of fertility devia-
tions from replacement is also removed by setting fertility at the replacement
level from 2000 onward (still keeping migration zero). This is the replacement
projection. In the fourth and final variant, mortality is held constant as well from
2000 onward. This momentum projection reflects only the effect of a young age
structure in 2000. In sum:
Projection Projected
variant Factors affecting future growth population size
1. Standard Young age structure, rising life expectancy, P
s
fertility above replacement, net immigration
2. Natural Young age structure, rising life expectancy, P
n
fertility above replacement
3. Replacement Young age structure, rising life expectancy P
r
4. Momentum Young age structure P
m









 from 2000 to 2100 for all countries. We relied on projection
software of the World Bank, which is readily available and easy to use, but in
principle the same exercise could have been undertaken with UN or other stan-
dard projection packages.  Global and regional estimates were obtained by ag-
gregating country-level projections.
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 Figure 1 presents the projection variants for the South. In the standard
projection, population size grows from 4.9 billion in 2000 to 8.9 billion in 2100,
an 81 percent increase. Removing the very small migration effect gives essen-
tially the same results, but eliminating the fertility effect reduces the projected
population in 2100 to 7.8 billion. Finally, removing the role of declining mortal-
ity as well after 2000 reduces future growth further to its momentum level, yield-
ing 6.8 billion in 2100. The differences between the successive projections pro-
vide an indication of the role of the different factors. The momentum inherent in
the current young age structure of the South is clearly the largest component.
Figure 2 presents the same set of projection variants for the North. Dif-
ferences between the variants are smaller than in the South. The replacement





































projection gives a population total of 1.30 billion in 2100, a slight increase over
the 2000 population size of 1.18 billion. This increase is almost entirely attribut-
able to declining mortality, because momentum is zero. The natural projection
ends up at 1.09 billion, significantly below the replacement projection because
fertility is below the replacement level. A very modest level of net immigration
leaves the standard projection (1.11 billion) slightly higher than the natural pro-
jection, but still below the 2000 population size.
The percent change in population growth between 2000 and 2100 from
these projection variants, for the North and South as well as for the world and all
major regions, is shown in Figure 3.
In order to directly compare the contributions of the different factors to
future population growth, a set of factor “multipliers” are calculated. Each factor


























multiplier equals the ratio of the estimated population with and without the com-
ponent at a future point in time:























where P represents the population size in 2000.














































































































= 1.39,  and P
s 
= 1 x 1.13 x 1.15 x 1.39 x P = 1.81 x P, implying an 81
percent increase in population over the next century (i.e. from P=4.9 to P
s
= 8.9
billion). Table 1 presents projected population by region, as well as estimates of
the multipliers for the period 2000 to 2100. Multipliers can also be calculated for
any year during the projection period, but this option is not pursued here.
The results in Figure 3 and Table 1 show wide variation among regions in
the contributions of the different factors to growth over the next century. A few
findings are noteworthy:
—Momentum is the largest component of future growth in the world and
all regions except in Europe (where the age structure has aged sufficiently in
recent decades so that momentum is slightly negative) and in sub-Saharan Africa
Table 1  Population projections for 2000 and 2100 and factor multipliers for
migration, fertility, mortality, and  momentum to 2100
Projected population
(billion) Multiplier
2000 2100 Migration Fertility Mortality Momentum
East Asia 2.04 2.70 1.00 0.94 1.14 1.25
South Asia 1.48 2.69 1.00 1.10 1.15 1.44
Middle East and
North Africa 0.33 0.73 1.00 1.28 1.14 1.50
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.67 1.98 1.00 1.64 1.21 1.50
Latin America and
Caribbean 0.52 0.88 0.99 1.04 1.14 1.45
Northern America 0.31 0.37 1.03 0.99 1.08 1.11
Europe 0.73 0.61 1.01 0.78 1.12 0.96
South 4.89 8.86 1.00 1.13 1.15 1.39
North 1.18 1.11 1.02 0.84 1.10 1.00
World 6.07 9.96 1.00 1.09 1.15 1.31
Source: Based on World Bank 1998
12
(where high fertility is the dominant factor). The momentum multiplier ranges
from 1.50 in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa to 0.96 in
Europe. For every region in the South except sub-Saharan Africa, momentum is
a larger contributor to growth than all other factors combined.
—Migration, as currently projected, is a minor factor even in Northern
America, where M
i
 is just 1.03.
—The multipliers for fertility, mortality, and momentum are larger in sub-
Saharan Africa than in any other region. As a result, future growth in this region
(+196 percent) is projected to be much higher than elsewhere.
—The fertility multiplier exceeds one in the world and in most developing
regions, but it is less than one (implying a negative impact on population growth)
in Europe, Northern America, and East Asia, areas where fertility is currently
below replacement.
Before proceeding, we comment briefly on the order in which the factors
are removed in the successive projections from which the different multipliers
are obtained. In principle, the contributions of fertility, mortality, and migration
could be removed in any order, although the additional projections required would
be substantial. In any case, the order has little or no effect in two cases. The
momentum multiplier is not affected because it would always be the residual
after the other effects are estimated.  The generally small migration multiplier is
also little affected because there is limited interaction with the other factors. On
the other hand, the fertility and mortality multipliers are affected by the order in
which they are removed. The reason is that, as noted earlier, the level of replace-
ment fertility depends in part on the mortality that occurs up to the average age at
childbearing. As a result, effects of changes in mortality below these ages are
incorporated in the fertility multiplier as defined here, and the corresponding
mortality multiplier is only affected by improvements in mortality above the mean
age at childbearing. Reversing the order in which these two factors are removed
therefore would result in a somewhat larger mortality multiplier and a somewhat
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smaller fertility multiplier. The choice of the particular order used here was based
on two considerations. First, this order leads to very simple analytic equations
for estimating the components of growth, as will be demonstrated below. Sec-
ond, analysis of different population projections for policy purposes almost al-
ways involves alternative assumptions regarding future trends in fertility and/or
migration, rather than in mortality or momentum, which are taken as given. For
example, the UN and the World Bank projections have emphasized variants based
on alternative future trends in fertility.
ALTERNATIVE  ESTIMATES  OF THE  POPULATION
GROWTH  COMPONENTS
The preceding analysis has documented large variations in future increases
in the population sizes of regions and attributed these variations to differences in
four demographic factors. The estimation of these components of growth and the
corresponding factor multipliers required the making of new sets of projections.
Although the preparation of population projections has become simpler because
of improved computer technology, it is still a cumbersome procedure, and few
demographers let alone policymakers routinely make projections. To overcome
this obstacle we now derive a set of simple analytic expressions to estimate the
size of different factor multipliers at the end of the demographic transition from
readily available measures of fertility, mortality, and age structure. These expres-
sions will be derived initially for female populations. To simplify the presenta-
tion below, the results for the momentum multiplier will be examined first.
Momentum
Previous research on the demographic determinants of population momen-
tum has resulted in a simple equation for estimating the momentum multiplier







where A represents the proportion of females under age 30 at the beginning of the
projection period (i.e., 2000) and A
m
 is this same proportion at the end of the
transition in a momentum projection (i.e., a projection with fertility at replace-
ment, mortality fixed, and migration zero throughout). In 2000, for example,
59.3 percent of the female population of the South is expected to be under age 30,
so that A= 0.593. A
m
 can be estimated as equal to 0.42 using a model mortality
life table for a female life expectancy of 66 years in 2000.5  According to this
equation the momentum multiplier therefore equals 1.41 (.593/.420). As expected,
this is virtually the same as the estimate of 1.40 obtained from the actual projec-
tion to the end the transition. In general, given levels of current mortality by age
(and hence A
m
), the population momentum inherent in the age structure is di-
rectly proportional to the proportion of females under age 30 at the beginning of
the projection.
Mortality
An equation for the mortality multiplier is readily derived from a variant of
the preceding momentum multiplier equation. Since this equation also applies when














 is again determined by the mortality level in the momentum
projection). At the high life expectancies that are projected to prevail at the end
of the transition, A
r




 is the female life













The fertility multiplier is determined by the extent to which fertility differs
from the replacement level over the course of the projection. Projections typi-
cally assume that fertility will decline (or rise) from its level in 2000 to the re-
placement level over the next few decades. If the number of years before fertility
reaches replacement equals y and the average proportional deviation from re-




= (1 + d)
y/30
This equation predicts that if fertility averages 50 percent above the re-
placement level over a 30-year period (i.e., d = 0.5 and y = 30) then M
f 
= 1.5,
implying a 50 percent inflation of the population at the end of the transition due
to this deviation from replacement.  In countries that remain at replacement




This multiplier is close to one for most populations. In a small number of
countries the effect from migration is substantial, but the reasons are country-
specific and no attempt will be made to capture them in an equation.
A SYNTHESIS
The preceding equations can be combined to relate long-range future popu-
lation growth to its demographic determinants. Ignoring migration, we focus on
the factors driving replacement and natural growth.
Replacement growth
The ratio of population sizes at the beginning and end of the replacement
projection will be called the replacement growth multiplier PM
r
 . It equals the
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In other words, replacement growth over the course of the transition is deter-
mined by just two factors: life expectancy at the end of the transition and the
proportion of the female population under age 30 at the start of the projection. A
comparison of the values of PM
r
 estimated from this equation with the values
obtained directly from the World Bank projections for 152 populations with sizes
over 1 million produced an excellent fit (R2=0.998).
This equation is further simplified if one assumes — as the UN and World
Bank do — that all populations will have the same level of life expectancy at the
end of the transition. In that case the only cause of variation in replacement growth










 equals 92.5 x A/30.
To illustrate an application of this equation, Table 2 gives the proportion of
females under age 30 in 2000 and the PM
r
values obtained from actual replace-
ment projections. The replacement multipliers, estimated as 3 x A for a life ex-
pectancy of 90 years, are in good agreement with the projection results. It is now
a simple matter to calculate the replacement multiplier for a different level of life
expectancy, by substituting this new level in the equation above. This is illus-
trated in the last column of Table 2, where female life expectancy at the end of
the transition is set at 100 years. As expected, the replacement multipliers are all
higher than they are with a life expectancy of 90 years. For example, for the world




The ratio of population sizes at the beginning and end of the natural pro-
jection will be called the natural growth multiplier PM
n
 . It equals the product of

















According to this equation, natural growth of the female population over
the remainder of the transition depends on the extent and duration of deviations
from replacement fertility as measured by the multiplier M
f
, on the level of life
Table 2   Percent of females aged less than 30 years in 2000, and replacement
growth multiplier PM
r
 to the end of the transition, by region, calculated from
projections and estimated from a model for female population
Percent of
Model estimate of PM
r
females less than Projection
Life expectancy
age 30 in 2000 estimate of PM
r
90 100
East Asia 51.2 1.53 1.54 1.71
South Asia 62.3 1.87 1.87 2.08
Middle East and North Africa 63.1 1.88 1.89 2.10
Sub-Saharan Africa 70.9 2.11 2.13 2.36
Latin America and Caribbean 58.3 1.75 1.75 1.94
Northern America 40.1 1.22 1.20 1.34
Europe 36.6 1.09 1.10 1.22
South 59.3 1.78 1.78 1.98
North 37.3 1.12 1.12 1.24
World 54.9 1.65 1.65 1.83
Source: Based on World Bank 1998
18
expectancy at the end of the transition (L
r
), and on the initial age structure (A). A
comparison of the values of PM
n
 obtained from this equation with the actual
World Bank projections for 152 populations again produced an excellent fit
(R2=0.998).  If we accept the World Bank’s assumption that female life expect-
ancy at the end of the transition will equal 90 years in all countries, then the
factors explaining variations in future natural growth are reduced to just two: the
fertility multiplier (M
f
) and the initial proportion of females under age 30 (A).
For most practical purposes these equations for estimating replacement
and natural growth in the female population provide simple but reasonably accu-
rate tools for analyzing variations in growth over the remainder of the transition
and for estimating the impact of changes in the factors on future population growth.
A similar set of  multiplier equations can be derived for the male population (see
Appendix). The male multipliers are usually close to the corresponding values
for the female population.
THE END OF THE  TRANSITION
As noted, existing projections of the UN and World Bank assume that at
the end of the transition all countries will have fixed levels of fertility and mortal-
ity and zero migration. These are convenient assumptions, because they are simple
to implement in projection exercises for large numbers of countries and they lead
to zero growth. In reality, however, there are likely to be variations in levels of
fertility, mortality, and migration among countries for the indefinite future.
In addition, it seems unlikely that the assumed long-range trends will pre-
vail on average. The assumption of no migration is least problematic on the re-
gional and global level because the effects of migration on the population size of
these aggregates is modest. In contrast, the assumption that life expectancy will
reach some maximum is questionable. In projections made in the 1960s and 1970s
the UN and World Bank also assumed a maximum to prevail, but at lower levels.
In successive revisions of its projections the UN has raised this maximum every
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few years, from 74 years in the 1963 assessment to 90 years (both sexes) in the
1998 assessment. It seems desirable not to impose a limit on life expectancy and
let it rise slowly over time. Similarly it seems doubtful whether fertility will level
off exactly at the replacement level on average. Again it is difficult to predict
what the actual level might be, but recent experience in countries that have reached
the end of their transitions suggests that fertility might well drop somewhat be-
low replacement.
Presumably, one motivation for making these simplifying assumptions is
that they lead to zero growth in population size. But if this is indeed an objective,
then an alternative set of assumptions can achieve it. Specifically, zero growth
can be achieved with rising life expectancy and below-replacement fertility, if
these factors offset one another. The precise level of fertility that would achieve
zero growth would depend on the level of life expectancy and on the rate at
which it is rising, and it might vary slightly over time. But such a scenario is
arguably a more realistic one for the end of the transition. It should be empha-
sized that the age structure would not stabilize under these alternative conditions,
and populations would continue to age indefinitely.
CONCLUSION
The most recent population projections of the World Bank and UN expect
the world population to grow from 5.9 billion today to about 10 billion in 2100.
Expansion is expected to be most rapid in the next few decades in Africa, South
and West Asia, and Latin America. The growth in these regions is attributable to
three demographic factors: 1) fertility remains above the replacement level, 2)
mortality continues to decline, and 3) the proportion of the population under age
30 is relatively high. Even if fertility could be brought to the replacement level
immediately, substantial growth is inevitable (from 4.9 billion in 2000 to 7.8
billion in 2100 according to the replacement projection) because of population
momentum. In contrast, populations in the developed countries of the North will
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either grow little or decline, because fertility is at or below the replacement level,
mortality is already low, and the age structures are no longer young.
The preceding analysis has measured the contributions of each of these
factors for the world and its major regions. The momentum inherent in the cur-
rent young age structure was found to be the main component of future growth in
all regions except Europe (where the population has aged sufficiently in recent
decades so that momentum is slightly negative) and sub-Saharan Africa (where
high fertility is the dominant factor).
APPENDIX
The male factor multipliers (identified by the superscript ’) are derived






























 refer to the life expectancy at birth at the end of the momentum
and replacement projections respectively. S represents the sex ratio at birth (number
of male births per female birth), and R equals the ratio of female to male popula-






 A S R / 30
Notes
1 In this study the end of the transition is defined as the time when the birth
rate declines to equal the death rate.
2 Assuming mortality reaches a fixed level and migration is absent.
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3 The term population momentum is sometimes used to refer to the future
population growth that would occur if fertility were held at the replace-
ment level, without modifying assumptions about trends in mortality and
migration. This study follows the convention used in the technical demo-
graphic literature, which defines momentum as the future growth if fertil-
ity is set at replacement, while holding mortality constant and assuming no




















5 Because the population is stationary at the end of the transition, A
m
 equals
the proportion under age 30 in a model life table population at the mortal-
ity level prevailing during the momentum projection.
6 Replacing L
r
 with 18 plus the life expectancy at age 18 gives a more accu-
rate result at lower life expectancies.
7 If deviations from replacement fertility are constant throughout the y years,
one would expect the multiplier to equal (1 + d)
y/T
 
where T is the length of
a generation (the term 1+d equals the net reproduction rate).  T generally is
slightly below 30 years.  However, in reality the deviations from replace-
ment decline with time, which introduces a bias that can be captured by
adding a correction factor c in this equation: (1–r)
y/TC.  In the simple ver-
sion of this equation that is used in the text, it is assumed that T x c = 30,
with satisfactory results.
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